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A B S T R A C T
Countries diﬀer markedly in their production of climate science. While richer nations are often home to a variety
of climate models, data infrastructures and climate experts, poorer sovereigns often lack these attributes.
However, less is known about countries’ capacity to use global climate science and customise it into products
informing national adaptation. We use a unique global dataset, the UNFCCC National Communications, to
perform a global documentary analysis of scientiﬁc submissions from individual countries (n= 189). Comparing
countries’ climate projections with their competence in publishing climate science, our research examines the
existence of geographical divides. Although countries proﬁcient in publishing climate science use more complex
climate modelling techniques, key characteristics of climate projections are highly similar around the globe,
including multi-model ensembles of Global Circulation Models (GCMs). This surprising result is made possible
because of the use of pre-conﬁgured climate modelling software packages. One concern is that these tools restrict
customisation, such as country-speciﬁc observations, modelling information, and visualisation. Such tools may
therefore hide a new geographical divide where countries with higher scientiﬁc capacities are able to inform
what goes into these software packages, whereas lower scientiﬁc capacity countries are dependent upon these
choices – whether beneﬁcial for them or not. Our research suggests that free-to-use modelling and training
eﬀorts may unwittingly restrict, rather than foster, countries’ capacity to customise global climate science into
nationally relevant and legitimate climate information.
1. Introduction
If countries are to adapt to the impacts of climate change, it’s critical
they possess the scientiﬁc capacity needed to produce knowledge on a
relevant scale and to translate it into policies to inform local decision-
making (Ho-Lem et al., 2011). Such thinking sits at the heart of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) eﬀorts to synthesise
climate science to inform policies under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Yet not all countries are able
to produce scientiﬁc climate information, or to the same extent. Studies
have shown that rich, high emissions countries publish the bulk of
climate research (e.g. Haunschild et al., 2016; Pasgaard and Strange,
2013). This ‘geographical imbalance’ (Pasgaard et al., 2015) makes it
challenging to inform policies equally if peer-reviewed publications are
favoured. As a result, ‘who’ produces climate science, and even ‘where’
climate science is produced, can have far reaching eﬀects for the
commitment to UNFCCC agreements (Corbera et al., 2015; Hulme and
Mahony, 2010) as well as the commitment to local adaptation eﬀorts
too (Blicharska et al., 2017; Miguel, 2017; Lahsen, 2007).
To understand these geographies of climate science, it’s crucial to
examine why diﬀerences in the publication of climate science have
emerged and what diﬀerences exist over countries’ capacity to custo-
mise global climate science. A major challenge here is how to compare
countries with diﬀerent characteristics (e.g. size, wealth, education,
stability). Measuring scientiﬁc outputs by peer-reviewed publications
has proved a reliable method for highlighting the volume and geo-
graphic distribution of climate research (Haunschild et al., 2016;
Pasgaard et al., 2015; Karlsson et al., 2007). But interpreting such
metrics as capacity to customise climate science entails the assumptions
that all countries have similar interests in publishing climate science, as
well as similar capacities to contribute research (cf. Dike et al., 2018).
An alternative approach is to compare the ability of countries when
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using and producing (adaptation-relevant) climate science where the
objective is the same for all involved. Any deviation from common
reporting requirements – either going above and beyond or failing to
meet set standards – would provide an indication of diﬀerent scientiﬁc
capacities between countries, including those with few peer-reviewed
publications.
To do this, our paper presents a global comparison of climate pro-
jections’ characteristics reported in UNFCCC National Communications,
as a proxy of a country’s capacity to produce nationally relevant,
adaptation-focused scientiﬁc climate information. Section 2 sum-
marises the literature on the geographies of climate science. Section 3
explains how we collected the data and how we classify countries ac-
cording to their competence in publishing climate science. Section 4
explores diﬀerences in reporting climate projections and countries’
compliance with UNFCCC requirements. Section 5 identiﬁes similarities
and variances in the modelling characteristics, and contrasts these with
countries’ publication competence. Section 6 details how the reported
climate futures1 are similar, regardless of countries’ quantity and
quality of publications. Sections 7 and 8 oﬀer a discussion about the
emergence of a new, and mostly hidden, geographical imbalance in the
way countries are supported to customise climate science for national
decision-making.
2. On the geographies of climate science
Bibliometric studies have repeatedly revealed a geographical im-
balance over the distribution of peer-reviewed climate publications
(Haunschild et al., 2016; Pasgaard and Strange, 2013; Karlsson et al.,
2007); and the authorship of IPCC reports (Corbera et al., 2015; Ho-
Lem et al., 2011). Nearly half of all non-Annex 1 countries (45%) had
no authors contributing to IPCC’s ﬁrst Assessment Reports between
1990 and 2007 (FAR, SAR, TAR, AR4) (Ho-Lem et al., 2011). Further-
more, a positive correlation exists between the wealth, education at-
tainment, number of climate publications and the number of IPCC au-
thors of a country (Ho-Lem et al., 2011; Karlsson et al., 2007) as well as
the stability of institutional arrangements within it (Pasgaard et al.,
2015; Pasgaard and Strange, 2013). In turn, historically the largest
carbon emitters, and arguably the less vulnerable to climate change,
have focused their research towards mitigation, not adaptation which
most interests highly vulnerable countries (Pasgaard et al., 2015).
Moreover, critical scholars argue that the ambitions of countries to
produce world-leading scientiﬁc climate knowledge2, and climate
models speciﬁcally, are shaped by varying histories and politics, and
can (unwittingly) create geopolitical entanglements (Mahony and
Hulme, 2018). For instance, Mahony and Hulme (2016) describe the
motivations behind the establishment of the UK Met Oﬃce Hadley
Centre to produce ‘sound science’ for politicians in order ‘to develop a
trust[worth]y model of one’s own’ (Mahony and Hulme, 2016: 465). UK
politicians thought it necessary to balance and inﬂuence the IPCC with
a specialist British entity. ‘The capacity to predict was seen as allied to
the capacity to adopt a political stance independent of both Europe and
the US’ (ibid). To this day, the Met Oﬃce Hadley Centre continues to
have a national as well as international agenda; the latter illustrated by
the release of a free-to-use regional climate modelling software package
known as PRECIS, designed for countries with lower scientiﬁc capa-
cities to make climate risk assessments (Mahony and Hulme, 2012).
With such socio-political ideologies guiding climate model devel-
opment, the central role of climate models in climate science and pol-
icymaking (cf. Shackley et al., 1998; Skelton et al., 2019), and the
hegemony of only a few countries producing climate models, resistance
to the application of climate research built elsewhere and for diﬀerent
purposes can be anticipated. Indeed, Myanna Lahsen (2007) has re-
vealed how Brazilian policymakers distrusted joint climate science
projects – between the global north and global south – believing them
to be another way in which unequal power relations are entrenched by
furthering the interests of the richer countries, not those of Brazilian
scientists or politicians. Without a global climate model, emerging
economies such as Brazil, can ﬁnd it diﬃcult to ‘act sovereignly’ in
international climate negotiations (Miguel, 2017: 7). With ‘climate
modeling appearing as a strategic science’ for emerging economies the
‘national production of this type of technoscience [climate models] is
an important pragmatic geopolitical approach for countries of the South
wishing to occupy positions within the international climate change
framework’ (Miguel, 2017: 8).
While Brazil and China have their own climate modelling centres,
other nations may lack the same level of technical infrastructure and
investment. Such observations have led Blicharska et al. (2017) to ur-
gently call for this so-called ‘north-south divide’ to be tackled. Fostering
‘Post-Paris long term climate [science] capacity’ requires moving away
from the ‘ﬂy in ﬂy out’ climate science consultancy paradigm to a mode
of training younger climate scientists also within countries’ universities
(Nasir et al., 2018: 130f; Dike et al., 2018).
Such studies, and calls-for-action, all problematize the idea of a
value-free science which is legitimate around the world and can be
imported and exported without encountering local or political friction.
Yet science is always infused with national interests, histories, and
politics that makes it more or less problematic to apply in diﬀerent
contexts. Both the UK and Brazil case studies above reveal similar po-
litical perceptions about climate models, regardless of their competence
in climate science. However, the comparison by Skelton et al. (2017) of
how climate science leaders produced their national climate projections
shows that leading countries also rely heavily on climate models pro-
duced outside their countries (partly to account for their structural
uncertainty, cf. Parker, 2010). Swiss, Dutch and British climate scien-
tists focused far more on customising these global homogenous datasets
into nationally legitimate climate science, even to the degree of (sub-
consciously) tailoring it to the countries’ social and epistemic values.
This tailoring included climate scientists interacting with certain users
of climate scenarios in a nationally particular way (through user re-
presentation, broad participation, or elicitation), as well as scientists
favouring research that reﬂected nationally particular assumptions of
science for ‘good’ decision-making (such as, peer-reviewed, novel and
innovative, or user friendly) (Skelton et al., 2017). While climate sci-
ence has been a supra-national, global endeavour since its inception a
hundred years ago (cf. Edwards, 2010), its global knowledge products
tend to homogenise local diﬀerences and meaning instead of enriching
the global datasets with local socio-political values (Hulme, 2010). As
such, studies that focus only on the origin of climate science miss the
political and scientiﬁc importance of customising that global climate
science into something that is nationally legitimate, salient and credible
(Cash et al., 2003).
3. Data and methods
To meaningfully compare countries’ capacity to produce nationally
relevant climate science for decision support, we conducted a doc-
umentary analysis of countries’ most recent National Communication
(n= 189). National Communications are a unique global dataset,
1 In this article, we use the term ‘climate futures’ to spotlight ways of en-
visioning futures in order to discuss climate change today. As such, ‘climate
futures’ emphasise multiple socio-economic and temporal frames used to de-
scribe climate change in the future. We introduce ‘climate futures’ to make clear
we aren’t comparing plausible future states of the climate in a particular region
(‘future climates’).
2 Throughout this study, we only analyse the use of knowledge derived from
climate science. This has, in part, to do with other types of climate knowledge,
for instance indigenous, experiential or artistic (cf. Engels, 2019), not included
in our UNFCCC dataset. However, as the word’s origin highlights, customisation
of climate science for national adaptation could well include weaving in other
nationally prevalent forms of complementary climate knowledges into climate
projections.
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which report on the progress of a UNFCCC member’s mitigation and
adaptation commitments. Analysis of this dataset has been undertaken
for a number of comparative studies, from the formulation and im-
plementation of climate policies across diﬀerent countries (Albrecht
and Arts 2005) to tracking progress made on global adaptation by
diﬀerentiating global leaders from the laggards (Lesnikowski et al.,
2015). UNFCCC provides clear guidance (UNFCCC, 2008) and training
sessions (UNFCCC, 2012, 2016) on what National Communications
should include. These submissions are authored and oﬃcially signed-oﬀ
by the countries in question. Analysing deviations from these reporting
requirements – by either going beyond or below expected standards –
are indicators for national diﬀerences in using and customising climate
science, potentially revealing a geographical imbalance.
We downloaded the most recent National Communication submis-
sions from the UNFCCC website, submitted to the UNFCCC between
30.10.1999 and 31.12.2016. Each one of the n= 189 submissions was
weighted equally, irrespective of when it was written (see
Supplementary Fig. 1). We then coded all the submissions manually.
This involved reading each document and recording answers to a range
of questions concerning climate projections in an Excel database. These
questions included (i) were Global Circulation Models (GCMs) or Re-
gional Climate Models (RCMs) used; (ii) what downscaling techniques
were used (e.g. statistical/dynamical); (iii) how many emissions path-
ways were used; and (iv) which timeframes were used (e.g. > 2080s)
(see Supplementary Materials for a full list).
Various countries reported multiple sets of climate projections, for
example one covering the entire national territory and a second one
only for a particular administrative region. To distinguish these, we
deﬁne a ‘set of climate projections’ as one product, potentially en-
compassing multiple climate models, outputs, and emissions pathways
to describe multiple yet coherent climate futures. This includes, for
instance, aggregating climate information from multiple climate models
and/or climate model runs for one emissions pathway. When a country
reported more than one set of climate projections, we applied two
criteria to narrow the selection down to one set. First, we prioritised the
set of climate projections that focused on the entire country, rather than
a single geographical region. Second, we selected the climate projection
that contained higher concentrations of information (measured as the
relative space used by text descriptions, graphs and tables).
In order to contrast countries’ capacity to produce climate projec-
tions with their general competence in publishing climate science, we
classify countries according to the quantity and quality of their pub-
lications. For this, we draw on Haunschild et al. (2016) comparing more
than 200,000 peer-reviewed publications and their citations between
1980 and 2015, using keywords similar to ‘climat* change’. By selecting
the proportion of papers belonging to the 10% most frequently cited –
the indicator PPtop10% – Haunschild et al. (2016) ranked countries’
competence in publishing climate change research. We use this in-
dicator to create three levels of publication competence: proﬁcient,
advanced, and preliminary. We deﬁne proﬁcient as a PPtop10%>20
and> 1000 published papers between 1980 and 2015. N=17 coun-
tries ﬁt this category, including many European countries as well as
Australia, New Zealand, and the US (see Supplementary Materials for
full list). All proﬁcient countries have dedicated climate modelling
centres developing GCMs and/or RCMs. Countries classiﬁed as ad-
vanced have> 1000 published papers but a PPtop10%<20. N=14
nations meet these criteria, including Brazil, China, Greece, India, Is-
rael, and Japan. In advanced nations, climate science is funded and
publications are numerous, but they are not often excellent. The re-
maining n= 158 countries have a preliminary competence with<
1000 published papers (which may or may not be excellent). This in-
cludes, for example, all African countries except South Africa, Chile,
Croatia, Liechtenstein, Tajikistan, and Viet Nam. In preliminary coun-
tries, publishing large amounts of climate science is a challenge, either
due to being a poorer, highly populated country or a smaller, richer
nation.
Lastly, our research highlights, and is subject to, some limitations
with the UNFCCC National Communications dataset. Amongst the
countries that failed to submit any climate projections in their National
Communications, further research revealed that Australia (CSIRO and
Bureau of Meteorology, 2007), Canada (Barrow et al., 2004) and Spain
(Gutiérrez et al., 2012), have in fact all produced national climate
projections. Why these climate projections were not included in the
submissions is unclear. Such observations are, however, helpful in re-
vealing the challenges of working with global datasets where reporting
requirements are either inconsistently met or simply ignored. Further,
the voluntary nature of reporting National Communications for non-
Annex 1 countries results in climate projections produced at irregular
intervals (see Suppl. Fig. 1). Thus, n= 10 countries reported climate
projections within their National Communications submitted between
1999 and 2008, complicating comparison as more recent submissions
have more climate models available. However, the majority (n=120/
189, 63%) of National Communications have been submitted in the
short time span between 2013 and 2016.
4. Did all countries include climate projections in their National
Communications?
Of the 196 UNFCCC member states, 189 countries submitted
National Communications3 . In 90% (n=170/189) of cases, countries’
submissions included climate projections as part of their vulnerability
and adaptation assessment (Fig. 1). While the UNFCCC reporting
guidelines don’t prescribe how many climate projections should be
reported, a broad consensus emerged. The majority of countries
(n= 126/189, 67%) provided a single, national, set of climate
Fig. 1. Number of sets of climate projections
reported in UNFCCC National
Communications, grouped by countries’ cli-
mate science publication competence. Most
countries submitted a single set of climate
projections. Distributions are compared with
Mann-Whitney U tests comparing two country
groups; ns denotes ‘not signiﬁcant’, *p< .05,
**p< .01.
3 Iraq’s submitted National Communication was unavailable for download.
Iraq was thus not considered in the 189 submissions.
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projections, while a minority of countries (n=43/189, 33%) chose to
report multiple sets of climate projections. Multiple climate projections
often focused on several diﬀerent spatial or administrative scales (e.g.
regions, cities and airports), and could be used to inform local gov-
ernment policies and decision-making.
Crucially, Fig. 1 highlights that the global distribution of climate
projections, based on UNFCCC National Communications, plays out
diﬀerently to what might be expected from the literature (cf. Blicharska
et al., 2017; Haunschild et al., 2016; Pasgaard and Strange, 2013).
Climate projections are produced and available across the globe – but
more often (and in higher numbers) in countries classiﬁed as pre-
liminary and advanced (n= 145/158, 92%) rather than proﬁcient in
publishing climate science (n= 13/17, 76%). A Kruskal-Wallis H test
conﬁrms that the number of reported climate projections is indeed
(inversely) correlated to a country’s publication competence (X2(2,
n=189)= 8.0, p < .05). This is even more surprising given that the
vulnerability section reporting guidelines for non-Annex I countries of
the UNFCCC are voluntary. Aware of various countries’ capacity and
resource constraints, the UNFCCC ran several ‘hands-on training
workshops’ before the submission of National Communications, in-
troducing free-to-use and well-established software tools such as
PRECIS and MAGICC/SCENGEN (UNFCCC, 2016).
Among the few preliminary countries failing to report climate pro-
jections are n=5 oil-rich countries (Angola, Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates) and n= 3 Small Island Developing States
(SIDS). This ﬁnding echoes that of Pasgaard et al. (2015) where SIDS
are correlated with lower numbers of climate change publications.
Among the proﬁcient countries omitting climate projections in their
National Communications are interestingly some which had them
readily available, such as Australia (CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology,
2007), Austria (Loibl et al., 2009) and Canada (Barrow et al., 2004)4 .
5. What climate model characteristics do National
Communications submissions share?
Of the n=170 (out of 189) National Communications that provided
climate projections, our research found that while the complexity of the
methods used correlates signiﬁcantly with a country’s climate science
publication competence, the number of climate models (e.g. Global
Circulation Models (GCMs) or Regional Climate Models (RCMs)) is in-
dependent of a country’s publication record.
5.1. Climate modelling complexity
As shown in Fig. 2, we created a rank order from the least to the
most complex climate projections approaches. For instance, while some
techniques don’t require specialist knowledge to produce climate pro-
jections, others allow a high level of customisation with diﬀerent sets of
observations, models or statistical methods. Modelling eﬀorts were
classiﬁed according to one of seven ranks:
1 Other. No details provided about the methods or data sources used.
N= 1 advanced and n=10 preliminary nations ﬁtted this category.
2 Lookup. Existing datasets, such as the United Nations’ Climate
Change Country Proﬁles (McSweeney et al. 2010), are used to insert
tables or ﬁgures into the National Communications. No data custo-
misation is possible.
3 Plug-and-play. Software packages including MAGICC-SCENGEN
(Wigley, 2008) and SimCLIM (Warrick et al., 2005) are used to
calculate climate futures using a simple energy-balance model with
pattern-scaling. Some data customisation is possible.
4 GCM only. Raw data is downloaded from portals such as ‘Climate
Explorer’ (Trouet and van Oldenborgh, 2013) and projections pro-
duced using one or multiple GCMs. However, the spatial resolution
of GCMs (100 km and more) cannot account for topographical fea-
tures such as mountain ranges or islands.
5 Statistical downscaling. GCM outputs are downscaled using statistical
techniques to achieve a higher spatial resolution. A high level of
technical skill is required to perform downscaling competently
(Wilby et al., 2002).
6 PRECIS. Tailored to researchers in countries with lower coverage of
observational datasets, the RCM PRECIS requires solid expertise
while running on a Linux-based PC with a simple user interface.
7 Dynamical downscaling. A highly demanding technical approach for
producing high-spatial resolution outputs (e.g. < 25 km) using
RCMs. Freedom for customisation is high. However, RCMs have is-
sues with nonlinear feedbacks and miss long-distance climate lin-
kages (teleconnections).
Fig. 2 reveals a clear-cut geographical imbalance in which countries’
capacity to use complex modelling techniques and to customise climate
model output into national climate projections is highly correlated with
their competence of publishing climate science (Kruskal-Wallis H test:
X2(2, n= 170)= 19.6, p < .0001). Further Mann-Whitney U com-
parisons between only two competence levels (Fig. 2, legend) reveals
that distributions diﬀer most for proﬁcient countries, which almost all
mapped onto a single, the most complex, category (i.e. dynamical
downscaling, n= 11/13, 85%). This contrasts with most preliminary
countries (n= 82/145, 57%) choosing a less complex modelling
method (i.e. lookup, plug-and-play, GCM only). The lack of scientiﬁc
infrastructures and data availability may help explain the preference for
less demanding climate modelling approaches. For instance, one of the
advantages of plug-and-play methods, such as MAGICC-SCENGEN, is
that they can be stored on USB devices and run oﬄine, getting away
from internet bandwidth problems. Furthermore, empirical studies
have shown that simple energy balance models can perform surpris-
ingly well compared to more complex climate models (e.g. GCMs) but
require a fraction of the skill, time, and technoscientiﬁc infrastructure
(Shackley et al., 1998).
That said, nearly a third of countries with preliminary numbers of
climate science publications (n= 45/145, 31%) made use of the two
most complex modelling approaches: PRECIS and dynamical down-
scaling, both using RCMs. In n=16 cases, output from the UK Met
Oﬃce’s freely available PRECIS model (Jones et al., 2004) was used.
Another n= 16 countries with preliminary publication competence are
smaller European nations beneﬁtting from pan-European RCM model-
ling projects such as ENSEMBLES (van der Linden and Mitchell, 2009).
These two factors help explain why preliminary and advanced nations
diﬀer almost signiﬁcantly in their distributions (Mann-Whitney U test:
X2(1, n= 157)=3.6, p= .06).
A geographical imbalance also emerged when analysing where the
underlying climate projections methods originated. Many of the mod-
elling tools were developed by Anglophone scientists for explicit use
outside their own countries, with focus on global applicability and user
orientation. MAGICC-SCENGEN (Wigley, 2008) and the UN Climate
Change Country Proﬁles (McSweeney et al., 2010) are from the United
States; SDSM (Wilby et al., 2002) and PRECIS (Jones et al., 2004) are
from the United Kingdom; and SimCLIM (Warrick et al., 2005) is a
commercial product from New Zealand. The two continental European
projects are diﬀerent in this regard: the Dutch ClimateExplorer (Trouet
and van Oldenborgh, 2013) is a database of GCM simulations (without
direct means to produce climate projections), while Germany funded a
science partnership with South Africa producing nationally-speciﬁc
climate projections (DEA, 2013).
4 The Australian omission is likely associated with new climate projections
being developed at the time, and not tied to political reasons. Australia’s Sixth
National Communication was prepared under the outgoing Labour adminis-
tration favouring climate action.
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5.2. Number of climate models used
Fig. 3a is a boxplot showing the number of Global Circulation
Models (GCMs) used to produce climate projections in countries’ Na-
tional Communications, grouped by their publication competence. Ex-
cluding the outliers, where Argentina used 42 GCMs and Finland 28
GCMs, the data shows little diﬀerence in the distributions of GCMs.
While the median number of GCMs is higher for proﬁcient countries, a
Kruskal-Wallis H test shows that the distributions are independent of
countries’ publication competence (X2(2, n=122)= 2.14, p= .34).
The wide use of multiple GCMs is thus encouraging, given that multi-
model ensembles inform about certain aspects of structural un-
certainties in climate modelling practices (Kreienkamp et al., 2012;
Knutti et al., 2010; Parker, 2010). The availability of multiple GCMs in
less complex climate projections may well have to do with up to 20
GCMs included in MAGICC-SCENGEN (Wigley, 2008). In addition,
more recent submissions beneﬁtted from projects such as the Coupled
Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP, e.g. Meehl et al., 2014) facil-
itating the download of multi-model output.
Fig. 3b shows the distribution in the number of Regional Climate
Models (RCMs) used by those countries employing PRECIS or dyna-
mical downscaling (see Fig. 2). A Kruskal-Wallis H test corroborates the
visual impression that the distributions of RCMs don’t diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly with publication competence (X2(2, n=54)= 5.17,
p= .08). However, Fig. 3b indicates that the recommended use of
multi-model ensembles (Knutti et al., 2010) hasn’t as yet been trans-
ferred to the use of multiple RCMs as well. Only European countries,
thanks to the European ENSEMBLES project (van der Linden and
Mitchell, 2009), have had multiple RCM simulations available for their
national territory. This may change as the global availability of RCMs
increases through initiatives such as CORDEX (Giorgi et al., 2009).
However, it remains to be seen how much countries with less pub-
lication experience and less technoscientiﬁc infrastructure can harness
these additional sources, as computational complexities, dataset size,
time required, and resources needed all increase.
6. What type of climate futures do countries report?
To be able to inform adaptation decisions, it’s key to not only have
the ability to use multiple models, but also to incorporate diﬀerent
socio-economic conditions and timeframes to understand how diﬀerent
climate futures can develop. Too many timeframes and/or emissions
pathways can result in an inability to work through diﬀerent variations,
creating a decision-making paralysis. Too few, by contrast, locks deci-
sion-makers into a deterministic view that discounts the importance of
uncertainty (Hulme and Dessai, 2008; Parker, 2010). To that end, this
section highlights: (i) how many timeframes were considered (e.g. up to
2050s or 2090s); and (ii) how many emissions pathways were used (e.g.
single vs. multiple).
First, the vast majority of countries – independently of their pub-
lication competence in climate science – used multiple timeframes
(n= 129/170, 76%) up to the end of the century (Fig. 4a). IPCC gui-
dance notes that ‘[t]he length of time period considered in the assess-
ment studies can signiﬁcantly aﬀect results’ (Knutti et al., 2010: 11). In
response, the UNFCCC recommended that countries ‘consider time
frames ranging from 2030 to 2100’ in order to adequately incorporate
climatic changes arising from socio-economic factors in longer-term
(e.g. after the 2060s) (UNFCCC, 2008: 12; see also Hawkins and Sutton,
2009). While comparing all three country classiﬁcations simultaneously
shows no signiﬁcantly diﬀerent distributions in the number of
Fig. 2. Distributions of climate modelling
complexity, ranked from less complex (left) to
more complex methods (right), grouped by
countries’ publication competence. More com-
plex modelling eﬀorts allow more customisa-
tion, but require a higher level of under-
standing and technoscientiﬁc modelling
infrastructures. Distributions are compared
with Mann-Whitney U tests comparing two le-
vels of publication competence; ns denotes ‘not
signiﬁcant’, *p< .05, ****p< .0001.
Fig. 3. a and 3b – Distributions of the number of Global
Circulation Models (GCMs, a) and Regional Climate Models
(RCMs, b) used in climate projections, grouped by countries’
publication competence. While Fig. 3a shows that multi-model
GCM ensembles are common independently of the country clas-
siﬁcation, most climate projections with RCMs have used only a
single one (Fig. 3b). Mann—Whitney U tests performed for com-
paring two country groups supports their independence; ns de-
notes ‘not signiﬁcant’. NB: Bold line denotes the median; box the
25th and 75th percentile; whiskers the 5th and 95th percentile;
points are outliers.
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timeframes reported (Kruskal-Wallis H test: X2(2, n= 161)= 4.9,
p= .08), comparing only two publication competence levels reveals
that advanced countries reported signiﬁcantly fewer timeframes than
both proﬁcient and preliminary countries (Fig. 4a). This has mainly to
do with the third of advanced countries reporting only a single time-
frame (n= 4/12, 33%).
Second, the number of emissions pathways (Fig. 4b) is independent
of a country’s publication competence (Kruskal-Wallis H test: X2(2,
n= 160)= 3.4, p= .18). Whilst UNFCCC guidance (UNFCCC, 2008:
12) acknowledges that ‘developing baseline scenarios can be complex
and time-consuming’, it is recommended that at least two emissions
pathways be selected – one high and one low temperature response – to
capture the uncertainty around future greenhouse gas emissions
(Kreienkamp et al., 2012).
Overall, n= 13 preliminary and n= 3 advanced nations reported
only a single emissions pathway and a single timeframe, depicting thus
a deterministic view on only a single, mostly pessimistic, climate future.
These countries most often reported a mid- to long-term future with a
high (e.g., A1B) (n=8) or very high (e.g., RCP8.5) (n=5) emissions
pathway. No country classiﬁed as proﬁcient did so.
7. Discussion: What is the geography of climate science for
adaptation?
Our examination of climate projections reported by countries
(n=170 of 189) in their UNFCCC National Communications, between
1999 to 2016, raises fresh questions about the debates on ‘geographical
imbalances’ (Pasgaard et al., 2015) and the so-called ‘north-south di-
vide’ (Blicharska et al., 2017). In particular, our analysis characterises
countries’ capacity to use and customise climate science. Our results
paint a complex picture:
(a). Comparing the complexity of modelling approaches, our study
supports that countries proﬁcient in publishing climate science are also
signiﬁcantly more often able to use the most sophisticated method
available. Dynamical downscaling requires most expertise and infra-
structure, but also allows most customisation (e.g., choice of models,
observation datasets, visualisation). In a study contrasting the climate
projections of three leaders in climate science, Skelton et al. (2017)
found that this customisation included making modelling choices in-
ﬂuenced by the respective country’s civic epistemology and political
culture in order to increase the climate projections’ national legitimacy.
Furthermore, comparing preliminary and advanced nations’ climate
projections reveals that the complexity of modelling approaches is only
just statistically insigniﬁcant (p= .06), even though the publication
competence is quite diﬀerent. This is partly due to preliminary coun-
tries able to proﬁt from pan-European modelling projects such as
ENSEMBLES (van der Linden and Mitchell, 2009), and partly due to
free-to-use climate model tools such as SDSM or PRECIS allowing
countries with few publications to outperform nations with many
publications. For instance, Bhutan and Paraguay are able to produce
high-resolution climate projections with PRECIS, while Brazil and
China have developed their own climate models, but reported projec-
tions using GCMs without downscaling.
(b). Our results question the so-called ‘north’ and ‘south’ binary (cf.
Blicharska et al., 2017; Karlsson et al., 2007) as too simplistic to
characterise countries’ capacity to customise global climate science. We
found that some ‘southern’ countries have their own climate models
and used a more complex modelling technique in their climate pro-
jections (e.g., Brazil, China, India, or Russia) while other ‘northern’
countries (e.g., Bahrain, Barbados, and the United Arab Emirates) failed
to report climate projections altogether. The ‘north-south divide’ calls
for a geographically fairer distribution in the production of climate
science, but is unable to explain diﬀerences within the ‘north’ and
‘south’. Our research questions the capacity of countries to use and
translate global climate science for their local context. For example,
‘lookup’ methods require no climate science expertise, while plug-and-
play methods such as MAGICC-SCENGEN already allow users to select
(preconﬁgured) climate models, timeframes and emissions pathways.
Further up the line, the use of ‘GCMs only’ requires already some ex-
pertise in working with ‘raw’ climate model output as well as signiﬁcant
computer storage and internet bandwidth. ‘PRECIS’ meanwhile is so
sophisticated that the developers (UK Met Oﬃce) run particular
workshops in order to guarantee competent use as well as to ensure
feedback of how reliable PRECIS output is for countries on diﬀerent
continents (Mahony and Hulme, 2012). With this breadth of ‘lookup’ to
highly complex modelling approaches, requiring no skill to much ex-
pertise and technoscientiﬁc infrastructure, allowing no to high custo-
misation, countries’ climate projections allow an empirically rich
comparison of countries’ capacity to customise global climate science
and produce nationally relevant information regardless of their peer-
reviewed publication output. Such insights call for debates on ‘geo-
graphical divides’ to be extended to the uptake of climate science and
its translation into national decision-support products, rather than only
the origin of peer-reviewed climate science.
(c). Our results indicate – surprising given the geographical im-
balance – a strong commitment by nations around the world to identify
and assess climate risks with climate models, even to the point that
countries with preliminary publication competence reported climate
projections more often (and in higher numbers) than proﬁcient nations
(Fig. 1). Factors that have inﬂuenced such countries’ capacity to per-
form the scientiﬁcally more demanding parts of the National Commu-
nications include: science and technology transfer in the form of free-to-
Fig. 4. Distributions of the number of timeframes (a) and emis-
sions pathways (b), grouped by countries’ publication compe-
tence. Signiﬁcances of Mann-Whitney U tests between two levels
highlight that only advanced countries used signiﬁcantly fewer
timeframes; ns denotes ‘not signiﬁcant’, *p< .05. NB: Bold line
denotes the median; box the 25th and 75th percentile; whiskers the
5th and 95th percentile; points are outliers.
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use climate modelling software such as PRECIS; free training sessions
provided by UNFCCC to give expert guidance on how to prepare climate
projections for the National Communications (UNFCCC, 2012, 2016);
ﬁnancial support to help fund the National Communication process;
and countries’ requirements to ‘develop high quality [Green Climate
Fund] proposals that demonstrate need [vulnerabilities]’ to increase
access to ﬁnancial aid tied to adaptation and mitigation (Fonta et al.,
2018: 1215).
(d). The preference of the UNFCCC for climate projections to be
included in National Communications (UNFCCC, 2008) may, unwit-
tingly, introduce new geographical imbalances. Modelling initiatives
such as PRECIS have been undertaken to assess climate risks in regions
where little data, or scientiﬁc infrastructures, exist (Mahony and
Hulme, 2012). However, making available climate science doesn’t ad-
dress longer-term capacity concerns such as who becomes an IPCC
author (Corbera et al., 2015; Ho-Lem et al., 2011) or who publishes in
high-impact journals (Haunschild et al., 2016; Pasgaard et al., 2015).
Using the example of early-career climate scientists in Africa, Dike et al.
(2018) emphasise the need to improve and support internal structures
for producing climate science within individual countries, for example
in universities (Nasir et al., 2018). Otherwise aims such as informing
adaptation policies through climate science while simultaneously ba-
sing those decisions on fairer and more locally produced scientiﬁc
knowledge base remains problematic, with geopolitical implications.
Although our research shows that most countries – independent of their
climate science competence – seem unconcerned about using multiple
climate models originating from other countries (cf. Miguel, 2017;
Mahony and Hulme, 2016), they might be concerned with a lack of
local customisation of such globally uniform datasets, including taking
over the tool producers’ social and scientiﬁc values of ‘good’ science for
decision-making (cf. Skelton et al., 2017).
Our research questions the extent to which eﬀorts to minimise gaps
in climate science availability may mask, or even worsen, a country’s
dependency on climate science produced only elsewhere. For instance,
the recent push towards co-produced climate services customised to a
stakeholder’s need (cf. Vaughan and Dessai, 2014; Porter and Dessai,
2017; Bruno Soares and Buontempo, 2019; Skelton et al., 2019) is very
diﬃcult to achieve when countries rely on pre-conﬁgured climate
modelling software. While in the near future the means of accessing
climate science might well change, as modelling software such as
MAGICC-SCENGEN is discontinued and climate information websites
are evolving (Hewitson et al., 2017), customisation restrictions will
likely continue.
Future research should critically examine what interrelated factors
maintain, shift and potentially worsen the geographical imbalance in
countries’ capacity to customise global climate science. Based on our
research, ﬁve factors play an important role: (i) UNFCCC’s reporting
requirements mirroring IPCC’s epistemic focus on climate models for
risk assessments; (ii) ‘goodwill’ eﬀorts by leading climate scientists in
rich, high emissions countries (predominantly Anglophone); (iii) ca-
pacity-building commitments from climate science leaders within
UNFCCC; (iv) UNFCCC assistance provided to non-Annex 1 countries
with fewer climate science publications when preparing National
Communications; and (v) countries’ improved access to ﬁnancial aid
(e.g. GCF) following vulnerability assessments.
8. Conclusion
Analysing individual countries’ capacity to use existing global cli-
mate science for informing national decision-making, our research
supports a geographical imbalance. Most countries – irrespective of
their climate science publication competence – are able to produce
climate projections with similar modelling principles. While countries
with less publication experience are now gaining valuable experience in
using scientiﬁc climate knowledge, especially free-to-use modelling
software, they haven’t as yet developed the capacity to customise
globally uniform datasets. These countries, as a result, remain dependent
on the climate models, expertise and tools to assess climate risks from
scientiﬁcally leading countries, and have to tacitly accept what con-
stitutes ‘good’ science for decision-making. Although climate modelling
tools improve the availability of global climate science they may also
contribute to a growing divide in the capacity of countries to customise
science to their national contexts.
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